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rstb2009Regret and the rationality of choices
Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde*
Institut Jean-Nicod (ENS-EHESS), Pavillon Jardin, Ecole Normale Supe´rieure, 29,
rue d’Ulm 75005, Paris, France
Regret helps to optimize decision behaviour. It can be defined as a rational emotion. Several recent
neurobiological studies have confirmed the interface between emotion and cognition at which regret
is located and documented its role in decision behaviour. These data give credibility to the incor-
poration of regret in decision theory that had been proposed by economists in the 1980s.
However, finer distinctions are required in order to get a better grasp of how regret and behaviour
influence each other. Regret can be defined as a predictive error signal but this signal does not
necessarily transpose into a decision-weight influencing behaviour. Clinical studies on several
types of patients show that the processing of an error signal and its influence on subsequent behav-
iour can be dissociated. We propose a general understanding of how regret and decision-making are
connected in terms of regret being modulated by rational antecedents of choice. Regret and the
modification of behaviour on its basis will depend on the criteria of rationality involved in
decision-making. We indicate current and prospective lines of research in order to refine our
views on how regret contributes to optimal decision-making.
Keywords: regret; predictive error signal; decision weight; addiction; paradoxes of rationality90
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1241. INTRODUCTION
Regret can be defined as a rational emotion in the
sense that its presence seems to be correlated with
improved decision-making. Regret is defined as invol-
ving both cognitive and emotional components. On
the basis of a comparison between what I got and
what I could have got, I may experience to a variable
extent the emotion of regret. On the basis of this
emotion, I will attune my future decisions. Anticipated
regret can then be defined as a decision criterion.
Recent neurobiological evidence has tended to con-
firm this simple view, which gives some credibility to
the incorporation of regret in decision theory that
had been proposed by decision theorists in the
1980s. However, finer distinctions are required in
order to get a better grasp of how regret and behaviour
influence each other. Anticipated regret can be defined
as a predictive error signal: the human brain on the
basis of past experience forms comparative expec-
tations on the results of available alternative courses
of action. But the information on the most favourable
course of action does not necessarily transpose into a
corresponding optimal decision. Clinical studies on
several types of patients show that the processing of
an error signal and its influence on subsequent behav-
iour can be dissociated. We will discuss some of these
data in order to refine our views on how regret contrib-
utes to optimal decision-making. We also propose a
general understanding of how regret and decision-
making are connected in terms of regret being
modulated by rational antecedents of choice.
Namely, regret and the modification of behaviour on
its basis will depend on the criteria of rationalityde@gmail.com
tribution of 11 to a Theme Issue ‘Rationality and emotions’.
1
0163—12/10/09—11:26–Copy Edited by: C. Darlin Premelainvolved in decision-making. Intuitively, the more
rational I think my decision was, the less I tend to
regret its outcomes. But we will be interested in less
clear-cut cases, like when, in particular, apparent con-
flicting rational decision criteria prevail in choice. The
aim of this article is to suggest conceptual refinements,
by evaluating the evidence of existing or ongoing
experiments, on how the rationality of choices,
the experience of regret and the optimization of
behaviour are in principle connected and potentially
disconnected in some clinical conditions.2. TESTING THE REGRET EXPLANATION OF
ALLAISIAN BEHAVIOUR
Regret has been incorporated into theories of rational
decision-making (Bell 1982; Loomes & Sugden
1982; Hart & Mas-Collel 2000) Qbecause of the
explanation it provides of apparent deviations from
rationality such as transitivity and independence of
choice from irrelevant alternatives. Regret-theory,
notably, explains the Allais (1953) Qparadox.
Let us represent the classical Allais paradox by the
following matrix.
Matrix 1: standard Allaisian behaviour.P (p ¼ 0.01)This jQ (p ¼ 0.10)ournal is q 2009 TheR (p ¼ 0.89)
A 500 000 500 000 500 000
B 0 2 500 000 500 000
C 500 000 500 000 0D 0 2 500 000 0125
126
127
128Here p, q and r are states of affairs whose probability
to occur is indicated by the figures in the second line
from the top. In between-groups experiments, aRoyal Society
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ARTICLE IN PRESSgroup of participants is invited to choose between
options A and B and another group between options
C and D. We then compare which options were
favoured in each group. As underlined in bold charac-
ters in the matrix, A is the option most often chosen in
the first group and D the one favoured by the partici-
pants in the second group. In within-subjects designs,
when participants are presented with the whole matrix,
the choice of the pair kA,Dl also prevails. Kahneman &
Tversky (1979) report the following results for Allai-
sian options presented to participants in extensive
lottery forms:
(i) between groups: A: 82%/D: 83%
(ii) within subjects: B–C: 7/A–D: 60/B–D:
13/A–C: 5.
These results exemplify a violation of the indepen-
dence axiom of Von Neumann and Morgenstern
decision theory. The violation can be made intuitive
by expressing it in terms of informational dispersion
on the part of the subject, in the sense that she
seemingly does not focus on the relevant decision-
theoretical core of the matrix or lotteries she is
presented with. Such normative informational focus
has been labelled in terms of the elimination of
common consequences of pairs of options in decision
theory. It is made clear in the following matrix that
states of affair r should be discarded as it makes appar-
ent that A and B and C and D are, respectively, similar
from that standpoint. But once stripped of their
common consequences, it is also clear that A and C
and B and D are equivalent and that it is irrational
to modify one’s choices across pairs kA,Bl and kC,Dl.
Matrix 2: deleting common consequences.229
230Phil. Trans
rstb20090P (p ¼ 0.01). R. Soc. B (2009)
163—12/10/09—11:2Q (p ¼ 0.10)6–Copy Edited by: CR (p ¼ 0.89)
231A 500 000 500 000 500 000
232B 0 2 500 000 500 000
233C 500 000 500 000 0
234D 0 2 500 000 0
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256Now, an obvious feature of Matrices 1 and 2 is the
intuitiveness with which the respective choices A–D
and B–D or A–C impose themselves on the subject’s
mind. Intuitiveness is by no means a criterion of
rationality, but the principle of elimination of
common consequences practically embodies the
axiom of independence which is at the core of rational
decision-theory, and makes it visually salient in
Matrix 2. However Allaisian behaviour as demon-
strated through Matrix 1 is also intuitive and
compelling. Individuals can easily justify their choices,
even though they deviate from rational standards of
decision theory. One can even experience conflicts of
intuitions when asked to perform a choice in this
task and knowingly deviate from rationality standards,
hence, perhaps, its classical denomination as
a paradox. Slovic & Tversky (1974) have shown that
experts in decision theory consistently exemplify
Allaisian behaviour even though they are of course
perfectly cognizant of the independence axiom. The
problem is then to understand what makes A–D. Darlin Premelaattractive in Matrix 1 and why Matrix 2 may not be
a sufficiently powerful debiasing device.
An answer is given in Matrix 3 which incorporates
anticipated regrets as weights of utility determining
the A–D choice.
Matrix 3: introducing regret.P (p ¼ 0.01) Q (p ¼ 0.10) R (p ¼ 0.89)
A 500 000 500 000 500 000
B 0 þ R1 2 500 000 500 000
C 500 000 500 000 0D 0 þ R2 2 500 000 0R1 and R2 are qualitative designations of levels of
regret. The usual explanation goes as follows: R1, R2,
in the sense that if p occurs, you would regret more
having chosen B instead of A, than if P or R occurs,
you would regret having chosen C instead of D. So if
B–D is the coherent pattern, R2—conceived as an
amount of anticipated regret—has no enough weight
to make you chose C, while R1 has enough of such
‘decision weight’ to make you chose A. Anticipated
regret is then considered an explanatory factor of
Allaisian behaviour. It vindicates the intuitive aspect
of Matrix 1 but it also preserves rationality as presented
in its crude form in Matrix 2 to the extent that it incor-
porates regret as an ingredient which is rationally
processed in decision-making, on a par with payoffs
and their associated probabilities. When one includes
regret, it is clear that the elimination of common conse-
quences does not yield equivalent choices any longer
and that apparent inconsistent behaviour can be
explained away. But the argument relies now on the
plausibility of a view of anticipated regret as inflecting
decision behaviour in the intended sense.
The integration of regret in decision theory has
been supported by recent neurobiological investi-
gation. Present studies on the neural correlates of
regret take advantage of previous observations on the
role of the orbitofrontal cortex in the processing of
reward and its role on subsequent behaviour. Rolls
(2000) has evidenced the incapacity of orbitofrontal
patients to modify their behaviour in response to
negative consequences. Ursu & Carter (2005) have
demonstrated how the anticipated affective impact of
a choice was modulated by the comparison between
the different available alternatives. These reasoning
patterns, consisting in anticipating contrasts between
actual outcomes and counterfactual ones (counterfac-
tual in the sense that those outcomes are the ones that
I would have gotten had I taken an alternative course
of action), are reflected in the orbitofrontal cortex
activity. More precisely, the impact of potentially nega-
tive consequences of choices is essentially represented
in the lateral areas of the orbitofrontal cortex, whereas
the medial and dorsal areas of the prefrontal cortex are
more specialized in the impact of positive conse-
quences. Camille et al. (2004) have shown that
patients presenting orbitofrontal lesions do not seem
to take regret into account in experimental sessions
repeating stimuli such as the following:
Partial feedback: in the partial feedback condition of
Camille’s experiment, subjects consider two wheels
Q3
Q3
–50
–200
200 50 200 50 –50
–200
200 50 –50
–200
Figure 1. Partial feedback condition.
200 50 –50
–200
200 50 –50
–200
200 50 –50
–200
Figure 2. Complete feedback condition.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSpresenting possible gains and losses, they pick up one
of them (squared) and get feedback only for the chose
wheel (figure 1).
Complete feedback: in the complete feedback con-
dition, subjects get also feedback for the foregone
wheel, making possible a comparison between what
they get (the squared circle) and what they could
have got (figure 2).
Camille et al. (2004) and Coricelli et al. (2005),
using the same experimental paradigm in an fMRI
study, show that the orbitofrontal cortex has a funda-
mental role in experiencing regret and integrating
cognitive and emotional components of the entire pro-
cess of decision-making. Across repetition of this task,
participants tend to become regret aversive. The
authors speculate that the orbitofrontal cortex uses
top-down process in which cognitive components,
such as counterfactual thinking, modulate emotional
and behavioural responses tending to increased regret
aversion.
Regret is understood as an emotion guiding
decision-making, fitting well with Damasio’s (1994)
understanding of the contribution of emotions to
rationality. The understanding of brain activities
reflecting anticipated affective impacts makes possible
the neurobiological validation of the regret hypothesis
in orienting decision-making towards apparent non-
normative behaviour. Laland & Grafman (2005) test
lotteries on medial orbitofrontal patients and observe
higher coherence among them than among healthy
participants, although patients are not more risk-
seeking. This is quite interesting because it shows
that these patients—the same population with respect
to which Damasio has elaborated his somatic marker
hypothesis—do not show incoherence owing to
inconsiderate risk-taking in decision-making.
Given plausible data on the connection between
orbitofrontal lesions and the absence of regret, it
would be interesting to directly tackle the original
motive for which regret had been introduced
in decision theory, namely to provide a plausible
explanation of seemingly irrational behaviour, suchPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
rstb20090163—12/10/09—11:26–Copy Edited by: C. Darlin Premelaas the one provoked by the Allais problem. We specu-
late that if the finding that orbitofrontal patients
present an impaired treatment of regret is robust,
and if anticipated regret is a correct explanation for
the type of behaviour usually induced by Allais pro-
blem, then those patients should behave normatively
when facing Allais paradox stimuli. Unlike healthy
subjects, they should not violate the independence
axiom, rather they would show consistency across
their choices and ironically behave normatively in a
task that has been considered a staple of irrationality
among decision theorists. Bourgeois-Gironde and
Cova (in progress) directly test Allais problems on
patients presenting focal orbitofrontal lesions, and
first results tend to document coherence, rationality
and limited risk-seeking behaviour among these
patients. These data would tend to confirm the overall
plausibility of the regret hypothesis in explaining Allai-
sian behaviour. In cases in which anticipated regrets
are a source of apparent biased decision-making,
their presumed absence seems to make behaviour
tend towards rationality as normatively encapsulated
by the axiom of independence. But a better view
remains to be acquired on the mechanisms through
which an emotional and cognitive state such as regret
manages to inflect behaviour in one way or the other.3. REGRETS AS ERROR SIGNALS AND/OR
DECISION WEIGHTS
Anticipated regret can be understood in neuroscience
and learning models as a predictive error signal
which is accompanied or not by an emotional state.
This signal can be simply defined as the difference
between an actual outcome and a fictive or counterfac-
tual outcome. On the basis of this signal, learning can
take place in sequential rewarding tasks, as in the case
in Camille and Coricelli’s studies. In those studies the
underlying hypothesis is that orbitofrontal patients do
not generate such signals and consequently cannot
modify their behaviour by processing anticipated
regrets. But an alternative hypothesis is that even
Q3
St S ″S ′
St+1
Figure 3. Sequential investment game.
4 S. Bourgeois-Gironde Regret and the rationality of choices
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
ARTICLE IN PRESSthough some patients may be unable to generate pre-
dictive error signals, some others may generate them
while these signals may not help modify their behav-
iour. In the absence of regret-aversive behaviour,
indeed, we need to discriminate between non-
generation versus inefficiency of error signals in
patients’ brains. The role of the orbitofrontal cortex
may be associated with the integration of properly gen-
erated error signals into behavioural strategies. In case
of lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex, this integration
does not take place, but an alternative cause of
non-integration, in the presence of impaired orbito-
frontal cortices, is a dysfunction in the production of
error-signals.
The question was raised by Chiu et al. (2008). They
observed that chronic smokers showed a reduced
influence of predictive error signals on subsequent
behaviour. However, given the neural response in the
caudate typically associated with the generation of pre-
dictive errors (e.g. Lau & Glimcher 2007), the authors
were also in a position to infer that there was no loss in
the production of these signals. There was an observa-
ble dissociation, then, between the generation of error
signals and the modification of behaviour. It was as if
the correct treatment of comparative information
between actual experience and what might have been
the case had no weight in improving subsequent
repeated decision-making. Cognitive processing of
information on potential outcomes and behavioural
control were not integrated.
To get a precise specification on how caudate based
generated error signals fail to play a role in optimizing
behaviour of addictive smokers, Chiu and his col-
leagues used the sequential investment game which
can be abstractly represented as follows (figure 3).
A subject starts in the state St, in the centre square,
and moves to state Stþ1, in the upper square. This is
what the subject actually does. She has access to her
actual gains. But she can also retrieve information
about fictive experience, i.e. what she would have
experienced had she followed another path, rep-
resented by lateral arrows in the schema, and
experienced alternative gains. In Chiu’s experiment,
the decision to move to Stþ1 or to alternative
states corresponds to investments of a portion of an
individual endowment on a realistically reproduced
fluctuating market. After each move the subject
could compare the results of his investment decisions
with the market returns history. Predictive error over
gains is then computed as the difference between the
maximum gain made possible by the market history
and the actual gain realized by the individual. Two
distinct groups of participants have performed this
sequential market task: smokers and non-smokers.
In one experimental condition, smokers have been
satiated while in the other they have been deprived
of nicotine.
In order to determine the role played by predictive
error signals in decision-making, Chiu et al. have con-
centrated their analysis on predictive errors in the case
of gains, i.e. only in situations in which participants
earned something below the possible maximum
market return. The question is to observe whether
behaviour at t þ 1 is dependent on less than optimal
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
rstb20090163—12/10/09—11:26–Copy Edited by: C. Darlin Premelapositive returns at t. Individuals in the control group
(non-smokers) illustrate this dependence as we
observe among them a positive influence on the fore-
gone maximal possible return on the subsequent
investment decision. This is not the case either for
sated or for non sated smokers. Behavioural patterns
on this sequential investment task show that predictive
error signals have no weights in smokers’ decision-
making. However, brain-imaging data show that fictive
error signals are equally generated among smokers and
non-smokers. Activity in the bilateral ventral caudate
nucleus has been correlated with the treatment of pre-
dictive errors in the investment game (Lohrenz et al.
2007). Chiu et al. conclude that the intact neuronal
response to predictive errors in smokers’ brains does
not translate into corrective behavioural strategies.
This dissociation between error signals and behaviour
can be further interpreted as a failure of integration
between emotion and rationality. Significant activity
in the anterior cingular cortex in nicotine deprived
smokers, which can in fact be interpreted as a response
to negative salient emotionally laden stimuli, show that
a ‘feeling of error’ is experienced by this group of par-
ticipants, even though it is not enough to modify their
subsequent decisions.
As Ahmed (2004) clearly puts it ‘drug addicts are
often portrayed as irrational persons who fail to maxi-
mize future rewards. [. . .] (But) to prove that addiction
is an irrational behaviour, one needs to show that
addicts would be better off if they had been prevented
from taking drugs in the first place’. The tacit postu-
late in the application of learning models, and
conceptual constructs such as ‘predictive error
signal’, to suboptimal behaviour is that among distinct
group of populations (addicts versus non-addicts)
there is a homogeneous and exogenous appraisal of
actual and counterfactual rewards. One can differently
speculate that this very ability to deal with equanimity
with such comparisons is precisely what is impaired in
addictive brains (Redish 2004). Chiu himself inter-
prets his results by confirming the idea that addicts
may be thought to have a diminished response to bio-
logical rewards: actual gains are not treated as rewards
in the smokers group and are not positive reinforcers
on which learning is normally based. But Chiu stops
short of positing an endogenous dependence between
the ‘internal’ supervisor which compares actual and
foregone outcomes and addictive behaviour, because
he observes that comparisons are intact while behav-
iour does not take as inputs those cognitive, possibly
associated with strong emotions, anticipated signals
of regret.
Many studies have documented the role of midbrain
dopamine neurons in generating predictive error
Q1
3
the current experiment includes many trials. Your task, in each trial, is to click on one 
of the two keys presented on the screen. Each click will result in a payoff that will be 
presented on the selected key, and will be added to your total payoff.
your goal is to maximize your total payoff.
click on one of the two keys.
Figure 4. The clicking paradigm.
Regret and the rationality of choices S. Bourgeois-Gironde 5
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
ARTICLE IN PRESSsignals (Schultz & Dayan 1997) and that dopamine
was more sensitive to the prediction of reward than
to the reception of reward (Heikkila et al. 1975).
In Redish’s model of addiction changes in the output
of dopamine cells are supposed to signal to the fore-
brain discrepancies between prediction of reward and
actual reward. The role of dopamine in learning
models can also be phrased in terms of a distinction
between monitoring and control functions more
familiar to students of metacognition. Addictive indi-
viduals seem able to generate proper signals of error
in the light of their past and present decisions but
they are not able to maximize future rewards by con-
ferring more weights to decisions that will issue on
optimal outcomes. Monitoring is intact but discon-
nected from cognitive control. This squares well with
complementary data on discounting behaviour in
non-smokers and smokers, the latter choosing com-
paratively smaller immediate gains over larger more
delayed ones (McClure et al. 2004). What is usually
described in this context in terms of lack of control,
impatience or myopia may be more generally inter-
preted as the behavioural manifestation of a more
general deficiency in the efficiency of dopamine
based error signals to guide decision-making in an
optimal sense.
The main lesson we can draw is the dissociation in
certain individuals between the presence of signals of
regret, both at cognitive and emotional and at implicit
and explicit levels, and the correlative absence of
strategic decision-making owing to the inefficiency
of these signals in view of behavioural control. We
can envision the reverse dissociation that would consist
in over regret-aversive behaviour uncorrelated to the
presence of reliable error signals. We saw in addictive
patients that error signals were generated, that a
course of action could be cognitively estimated to be
the most optimal and that, yet, this estimation was
not transposed into actual behaviour. Observing mani-
festations of Tourette’s syndrome, one is tempted to
describe a reverse sequence: an action is selected,
which escapes cognitive and motor control (it is felt
as an urge or a tic), and post hoc regret, if experienced,
cannot be translated into a reliable error signal for the
next occurrence of an action of this type. Blum et al.
(1996) argue that the dopaminergic system, and in
particular the dopamine D2 receptor, has beenPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
rstb20090163—12/10/09—11:26–Copy Edited by: C. Darlin Premelaprofoundly implicated in deficiencies of reward mech-
anisms in Tourette’s syndrome. Overproduction of
dopamine by the brain may induce a patient to pro-
duce involuntary and uncontrolled actions. These
involuntary actions should not in principle be associ-
ated with efficient predictive error signals as they are
uncontrolled.
An attempt at capturing this general prediction
through a precise experimental paradigm is still tenta-
tive and we simply suggest a possible way of making
use at this juncture of the well-known behavioural
economics so-called clicking paradigm (Erev &
Barron 2005) (figure 4) Q.
Simple decision tasks such as the clicking paradigm
present the opportunity to manipulate the information
on expected outcomes and feedback in a very flexible
way. It is first possible to leave gains and their probabil-
ities unknown at the moment of choice. Participants
decide in a state of full ambiguity in the sense, then,
that no information is made available. One can then
vary the expected gains as the task unfolds, making it
an implicit learning task, on the model of the classical
Iowa Gambling Task (Damasio 1994). It is also poss-
ible to provide a feedback, either partial or complete,
once a choice is made between the two boxes. This
reproduces the two major conditions in Camille and
Coricelli’s experiments. But in the absence of explicit
information at the moment of choice, the difference,
again, is that no calculus is explicitly made at the
moment of choice. The regret task is then embedded
in an implicit learning task. In other terms, regret, as
the task unfolds, will not tap directly into a cognitively
elaborated anticipated counterfactual reasoning
process, but directly into the experienced value of
each box.
Another layer in the clicking paradigm can be
manipulated, which more closely relates to the norma-
tive dimension of regret we are interested in. In
previous studies on the neurobiology of regret, the
question whether regret was rational or not has been
left aside. However, one can presume that regrets are
finely modulated by their normative antecedents.
Schematically, if an individual is not responsible for
any bad consequence she faces, that individual is less
liable to experience regret than if she can attribute
to herself the authorship of the act leading to that
consequence (Zeelenberg 1999). Responsibility and
Q2
Q3
0
50
0
200
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Q5
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ARTICLE IN PRESSself-attributed authorship figure among what we label
the rational antecedents of regret. Availability of
information about the consequences of one’s choices
is another obvious component of the rationality of
regrets. In the clicking paradigm, one relevant combi-
nation in order to study the adaptive impact of regret
among Tourette patients would combine implicit
learning, explicit feedback and an experimental
manipulation of the connection between choices and
consequences. More precisely, patients will sometimes
get a feedback for choices they have not made, whereas
the box they have actually clicked will yield no feed-
back. If one is in a position to observe no difference,
in terms of regret aversive behaviour, for outcomes
that correspond and outcomes that do not correspond
to actual patients’ choices, it would constitute starting
evidence in favour of a disconnection between regret
and a typical rational antecedent of choice such as
authorship or responsibility.
It has been more generally noted that Tourette’s
syndrome patients had paradoxical (or, at least, diffi-
cult to understand) attitudes with self-attribution of
responsibility (Schroeder 2007). Those patients are
presumably over-attributers of self-responsibility,
which would be confirmed by a salient behavioural
pattern over our crucial condition of the box-clicking
experimental design. This invites to further questions
over the alleged constitutive connection between
regret and its rational antecedents. The introduction
of regret in decision theory in terms of decision
weights must be refined in order to take into accounts
the cases in which anticipated regret is under-weighted
(e.g. in addictive patients) or over-weighted (e.g.
possibly in Tourette’s patients).739
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7684. DECISION TYPES AND REGRET
One type of normative antecedents that can modulate
the triggering of post hoc or anticipated regret in
decision-making is the type of procedure one follows
and the awareness with which one follows that pro-
cedure. Imagine one is deliberately negligent in
deciding in the Allais matrix, it is possible that
having not experienced anticipated regret she will
experience no post hoc regret either. She has left the
outcome to chance and at best she will be more or
less disappointed by her lack of luck or, inversely,
may experience non-normatively rejoicing if lucky
enough. But it may be abusive to properly speak of
regret in the case of negligence and luck, except may
be of post hoc second-order regret not to have devoted
more time and energy to pondering one’s decision.
Evocative of the conceptual difficulties surrounding
moral luck when defining an agent as morally
responsible (Williams 1981), we expect our emotions
to be attuned to our normative status: scruples
are the mark of moral deliberation in the same
way as anticipated regret could be of our rational
decision-making.
One case in point, then, is to be able to experimen-
tally discriminate between regret linked to outcome
and regret linked to procedure. Pieters & Zeelenberg
(2003) underline two sources of regret: outcome and
procedure. The use of poor decision procedures,Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
rstb20090163—12/10/09—11:26–Copy Edited by: C. Darlin Premelawhen recognized by the subject, may arouse regret of
its own. We will distinguish the case in which subjects
have given more or less dedication to their decision
procedures, on a scale that goes from complete negli-
gence to extreme conscientiousness, with the other
case in which subjects may hesitate between compet-
ing procedures possibly embodying alternative
criteria of rationality. As we have already glossed with
respect to the Allais problem, alternative solutions
may self-impose to an individual’s mind. This is
what makes this decision problem a paradox. But
how regret, in such paradoxical situations, may
become a mark of rationality?
Regret is usually provoked by the emotional impact
of the foregone alternative. When the choice of the
latter has weak normative appeal the standard predic-
tion is that in spite of a negative outcome following it,
the choice of the more normatively appealing alterna-
tive is itself sufficient to block post hoc regrets. Let us
give a very simple example of this situation. Choose
between lotteries A and B (figure 5).
Imagine you choose B but get 0 and A yields 50.
You would certainly be disappointed but do you have
anything to regret? It would have been a clear irrational
choice to prefer A over B. For some individuals, the
rationality of choosing B may be enough to block
regrets, would the imagined situation have occurred.
Note that this situation is not symmetrical with respect
to lucky issues. Imagine you choose A, get 50 and
would you have chosen B it would have yielded 0.
Now it is hard to refrain one’s rejoicing on the basis
of post hoc rationalization.
Our issue is with decision problems for which there
is no such normative gap between the alternatives.
There is a special problem in situations in which it is
particularly hard to make up one’s mind about the
respective normative appeal of the choices presented.
In paradoxes such as Allais’s problem, a lucid partici-
pant may mentally balance the intuitiveness of one
type of choice versus the other with no clear decision
criterion to use but, precisely, the attempt to minimize
anticipated regrets. Procedural indeterminacy, in that
very case, may turn potential regret linked to outcome
into the sole rational decision criterion at hand.
The investigation of how regret is a mark of the
rationality/irrationality of choice procedures must
include, in those special contexts in which subjects
may hesitate to apply alternative norms and pro-
cedures, an independent measure of the decisiveness
or confidence with which the decision has been made.
We can conceive of two ways in view to add this cru-
cial measure, direct and indirect. One can consistently,
along the performing of a task, elicit the degree of con-
fidence that accompanies the decision performance.
Confidence scales provide a common means, along
Q1
Q3
4
imagine a being with great predictive powers.
you are confronted with two boxes: B1 and B2. B1 is 
opaque and B2 is transparent, you can see that it 
contains C1.
B2 contains C1; B1 contains either C10 or nothing.
you may choose B2 alone or B1 and B2 together.
if the being predicts that you choose both boxes, he 
does not put anything in B1; if he predicts that you 
choose B1 only, he puts C10 in B1.
what should you choose?
Figure 6. A Newcomb problem.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSwith post-wagering methods (Persaud 2007) and other
confidence elicitation methods favoured by exper-
imental economists (Holt & Laury 2002). We will
not dwell upon the further methodological difficulties
affecting the addition of those measures to the repeti-
tive unfolding of an experimental session, as we
propose to proceed in a completely different in-built
manner. We will take advantage of a classical decision
problem, Newcomb problem (Nozick 1969), pre-
sented as involving a paradox of rationality in which
the choice of alternatives coincides in principle with
types (rather than levels) of confidence vis-a`-vis one’s
choice (Baratgin et al. in preparation).
Newcomb problems have the following structure
(figure 6).
Let us label people one-boxers and two-boxers
according to their decisions in the Newcomb pro-
blems. What is the presumed mental typology
associated with those decision-types and how does it
connect to the issue of normative antecedents of
regret? Two-boxers go against the prediction. The
decision criteria they presumably follow have been
characterized, in the philosophical branch of decision
theory, as causalists versus evidentialists (Joyce
1999). Two-boxers show, so to say, a higher autonomy,
that is, a higher level of decisiveness, in their choices
than do one-boxers, whose possible faith in their
choice amounts to a form of alienated confidence or
credulity. But integrating in one’s decision-criteria
predictions, signs and symbolic value may not be
altogether irrational (Nozick 1993). It is at least perva-
sive enough, as in convincing oneself of one’s good
health by accomplishing acts that could be signs of
one’s good health or of the influence of one’s vote in
national elections by going to vote (Quattrone &
Tversky 1984).
Shafir & Tversky (1992) have run the first empirical
investigation of Newcomb problems. They submitted
to their subjects a Newcomb problem as a bonus
problem at the end of a series of Prisoner’s Dilemmas
via computer terminals. Their cover story was that
‘a program developed at MIT was applied during the
entire session (of Prisoner’s Dilemma choices) to
analyze the pattern of your preference, and predict
your choice (one or two boxes) with an 85 per cent
accuracy’. Although it was evident that the money
amounts were already set at the moment of choice,
most experimental subjects opted for the single box.Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
rstb20090163—12/10/09—11:26–Copy Edited by: C. Darlin PremelaIt is ‘as if ’ they believed that by declining to take the
money in Box B2, they could change the amount of
money already deposited in Box B1. They have not
tested whether regret was different when outcomes
are revealed to one-boxers and two-boxers.
We formed the prediction that one-boxers, when
facing negative outcomes, would experience a greater
amount of regret than would two-boxers in the same
situation. This is due, we speculate, to the lesser
decisiveness or autonomy with which those choices
are made, in spite of their greater faithfulness to the
prediction. If a difference emerges between types of
decision and amount of regret in the Newcomb
problem, this can be considered as a step forward a
better understanding of how regret taps into rational
antecedents of choices and can be modulated by com-
peting criteria of rationality. We proceeded in a way
comparable to Shafir and Tversky’s as our participants
were told that if the program had predicted that they
would now choose the two boxes, Box B1 would be
empty, and if it had predicted that they would
choose Box B1 only, it would contain E10.
The game was framed so that Box B1 would
always be empty when participants chose it. So when
participants chose Box B1 þ Box B2, they would earn
E1 and nothing when they chose Box B1. We added
a retrospective measure of regret on a 5-point scale.
Our results show a significant difference between
types of choices and levels of regret as captured on
this scale. The following table presents descriptive
statistics for the variable Regret for each type of
decisions (one-boxers or two-boxers) in the Newcomb
problem.
Qanalysis number means of regret ICtwo-boxers 20 2.25 0.6
one-boxers 10 4.23 1.21
total 30 2.93 0.66Two-boxers experience a statistically significant
lesser amount of regret than one-boxers in spite, of
course, of the disappointment of discovering that
the second box is empty. The reason is that two-
boxers acted with a higher level of confidence and
made a choice that was less dependent on external
guidance than one-boxers. It is true that one-boxers
having put their faith in the Newcomb prediction
feel fooled by the experiment. The disappointment
is in principle the same among the two types of
deciders in the sense that they both miss E10 that
they expected, but the way in which they have lost
it radically differ. In the case of disappointed one-
boxers, they think that they should have not trusted
the prediction; in the other case of disappointed
two-boxers, they have less reason to think that
things would have been otherwise would have they
chosen Box B1 only. This result tends to show that
regret is sensitive to the way disappointment occurs
as well as to the fact whether I can retrospectively
assess my decision criterion as being the most
rational, when conflicting decision principles were
available at the moment of choice.
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ARTICLE IN PRESS5. CONCLUSION
We addressed the question whether regret is modu-
lated by the rationality of decision procedures on the
basis of existing or prospective experiments on patients
and healthy subjects. We think that a variety of rational
antecedents of choice explains the impact of regret on
subsequent decision behaviour. Extant neurobiologi-
cal studies by Camille et al. (2004) and Coricelli
et al. (2005), on the adaptive role of regret in
decision-making, rightly emphasize the necessary inte-
gration of emotional and cognitive components in view
of optimal decision behaviour. We think that further
conceptual distinctions are useful, in particular
between regrets considered as error signals and regrets
as decision weights, in order to uncover the cognitive
and neural mechanisms through which regret posi-
tively influences behaviour. Dissociations between
the ability to anticipate regret on the basis of infor-
mation on alternative rewards and the ability to
implement a behavioural strategy in accordance with
this piece of information may occur in certain types
of patients. We labelled this difference in terms of
regrets as error signals and regrets as decision weights.
Regrets can be under-weighted or over-weighted in
decision-making, loosening the connection between a
proper processing of error signals and behaviour.
In healthy individuals, we postulate a calibration
between the rational processing of information in
the decision task and the level of regret experienced.
In chronic smokers and Tourette syndrome patients,
we observe, on the contrary, that the generation of
error signals may be inefficient in reinforcing optimal
behaviour, either because information has no weight
on decision-making or because it is improperly
processed.
Regret is not only dependent upon the quality of
information processing relative to past and future
outcomes. It is, as we termed them, also dependent
upon an array of rational antecedents of choices,
i.e. factors that make it more or less rational to
experience regret. Being sure that I have properly
processed information that was available to me is
one of these factors. When I realize that I neglected
some relevant aspects of the situation in making a
decision that issued in a poor result, I am liable to
experience more acute pangs of regret than if I were
meticulous. Conversely, I may feel regret only for
outcomes vis-a`-vis which I bear some degree of
responsibility. When nature or hazard has yielded
the outcome, I have no reason to blame myself for
what happens. This conflict between responsibility
and nature (or God) is what is paradigmatically
encapsulated in the famous Newcomb paradox.
We addressed the issue to know whether regret
associated with the experience of disappointing
outcomes in an experimental Newcomb test was
dependent on the types of decision subjects were
invited to make. We observed that when subjects
were not deferring their decision-criteria to an exter-
nal guidance they tended to experience less regret
than in the contrary case. This is but a seemingly
paradox to say that regret is both triggered by my
implication in a course of action and attenuated by
the feeling that I acted as an autonomous agent.Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
rstb20090163—12/10/09—11:26–Copy Edited by: C. Darlin PremelaFuture clinical and neurobiological studies on regret
will probably tackle this deep philosophical issue of
the connection between self-blame and free will.REFERENCES
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